Prussian Socialism Episode 13: Guderian and the Blitzkrieg
It's August 1941, do you drive on Moscow or the Ukraine? Take Moscow, and Germany deals a huge blow to Soviet moral and cripples the USSR’s logistical system. Take Ukraine, and Germany captures hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops and secures the breadbasket of Europe. Of course, history can only play out one way. Hitler ordered a drive on the Ukraine. But what if he had ordered an all-out attack on Moscow? Could Germany have won the war in the East in 1941?
After the war, many generals argued that Germany could have won. Prominent among them was tank-warfare theorist and Panzer commander Heinz Guderian. In his post-war book Panzer Leader, Guderian recounts his role in shaping Germany’s armored units and doctrine, arguing that Germany could have won if Hitler had listened more to his generals. Was Guderian right, or was he just coming up with excuses?
Greg Conte discusses Guderian’s arguments and record, and the role of mechanized warfare with fellow autiste and WWII-enthusiast Hans.
Books mentioned:
Heinz Guderian Panzer Leader
David Irving Hitler's War
Friedrich von Mellenthin Panzer Battles
Erich von Manstein Lost Victories
Thank you, Greg! You do a fantastic job of presenting history and historical figures in a dynamic fashion. Your delivery and knowledge are top flight.
I would say that ultimately the British Empire was incapable of defeating Germany, and the the British Empire with the Soviet Union were incapable of defeating Germany. Only the absolutely incomprehensibly massive US industrial capacity was able to save the British Empire, save the Soviet Union and defeat Germany.
Every country had a Guderian, but only Guderian had a Hitler which believe in and support him.
The orders which should have been given after the fall of Kiev should have been that no one is to talk about Moscow as an objective until 1942. The 4th Panzer Group should have taken Ladoga and link up with the Finnish Army East of Lake Ladoga and then hold until relieved. This would have prevented the Soviet Union from supplying Leningrad via Lake Ladoga. The 3rd Panzer Group should have advanced on Voronezh and then clear the western bank of the Don before digging in for the winter. The 2nd Panzer Group should have advanced on Kharkov, then along… Read more »
I agree that Hitler made the right call to send Guderian’s Army Group Center Panzers South to form a double-envelopment at Kiev with von Rundstedt’s Army Group South, which did not have such generous tanks and manpower allotted as AGC. Although I think the economic arguments for this decision are overstated in the operational context, I don’t think the order could have been avoided, quite frankly. In the event, the liquidation of Soviet armies just East of Kiev by late September was the largest envelopment in history. If Guderian’s tanks in Army Group Center had been allowed to continue East… Read more »
There were Soviet Railroads which bypass Moscow to the east and the Soviet Union was already moving most of their industrial base to Siberia. Additionally the winter of 1941/42 was the worst in recorded history and the weather was much better for an offensive around the Black Sea than around Moscow.
The Soviet Union was never so close to breaking than the end of 1941 and that was the time to take the Caucasian Oil, the loss of which it could not have recovered from. The Soviet Union was better prepared to defend the Caucasus in 1942. Moscow was well defended in 1941 but could not have defended Moscow in 1942 without Caucasian Oil.
Herman Goering did great with the 4 year plans in rectifying Germany’s material shortages and he also personally developed the successful tactics of using Daytime fighters to attack night bombers after the flames of the target city illuminated the sky. This allowed both Night Fighters and Day Fighters to attack Night Bombing attacks. Additionally, Goering gave the Luftwaffe the political clout to receive the economic support it needed. Goering also appointed Earhart Milch as his second who administered the Luftwaffe excellently.
Lend Lease gave the Soviets the stuff it needed in order to allow the Soviets to uproot it’s vulnerable industry and move it east of the Ural Mountains and still build up material at the same time. The Tanks and Aircraft were not at all crappie when you consider that the Germans went into Barbarossa with Panzer IIs in addition to French and Czech tanks due to the shortage of Panzer IV and IIIs. Lend Lease made up for all the raw materials lost to the Germans which kept Soviet industry working. I believe that Lend Lease gave the Soviets… Read more »
Another great book to read is “Panzer Operations” by General Erhard Raus. His record was quite impressive.
The panzerjager that lacked a defensive machine gun was the Elefant aka the Ferdinand, which was also known as the Panzerjager Tiger (P) because it was a panzerjager conversion of the Porsche Tiger tank prototype which had lost out to the actual Tiger tank produced by Henschel; Porsche had produced about 90 chassis on anticipation of winning the Tiger contract; when Porsche lost to Henschel he had to convert those 90 chassis to something so the Elefant / Ferdinand was born. After Kursk the surviving vehicles had a defensive machine gun added.
The Porsche Tiger prototype was ridiculously complex with a petrol-electric transmission which also used up scarce resources (copper for the electrical generators). So no surprise Henschel won the Tiger contract.
In my opinion the Ferdinand was a great defensive weapon but should never have been used in the attack. The Stug III and later the Jagdpanzer IV, “Hetzer” and Jagdpanzer V were much more useful. Instead of converting Porsche chassis into Ferdinands, I would have simply made them into two Porsche Tiger Battalions and leave it at that. As Tanks rather than tank destroyers they would have been more useful even though less mechanically reliable than the Henschel production version. Germany had a lot of Stug IIIs but not a lot of Tiger Tanks. 2 more Tiger Battalions would have… Read more »
Russian rail gauge was not a narrow gauge; Russian rail gauge was slightly larger than the standard rail gauge that the Germans used.
Strangely enough the Spanish, Portuguese and Ireland also had large gauge railroads.
Light tanks due to their small size usually had a 1 man or sometimes 2 man turrets. The British and Russians went with 2 man turrets for their larger tanks as well until they learned their lessons and copied the German 3 man turret. It was the French who stuck exclusively with the 1 man turret, for their light, medium, and heavy tanks alike. There were several reasons for this; the French military age pool of recruits was shrinking in the interwar period and the 1 man turret meant fewer recruits were needed for tank crews; also the smaller turret… Read more »
Secretly, Vichy France was conducting research into development of a 3 man turret with a high velocity 75mm gun to fit the SOUMA 40.
The most interesting thing I learned is that the optics debate goes back until at least WWII tank warfare.
Moscow should have been put off till 1942. The Soviet Union was already planning to evacuate Moscow and continue the war anyway. But, it doesn’t matter how many tanks, trucks, artillery, aircraft etc. that the Soviets produce or receive from Lend Lease if they lose their oil supply from the Caucasus or Iran. Without that oil the entire Soviet War effort would depend entirely on whether or not enough American oil could be shipped across the Pacific Ocean to Vladivostok and across Siberia on the Transiberian Railway, or to Archangel via the Arctic Ocean passed the German Aircraft and Ships… Read more »
Ryan Dawson has a video that makes some of these exact points; he goes further in showing how Germany could have gotten Turkey on their side prior to Operation Barbarossa, and attacked through Turkey and Iran directly into the Caucasus oil producing regions of the USSR; this would have cut off most Soviet oil and by occupying a friendly Iran would have blocked a major route of Western aid to the USSR.
Just by taking the Chechen oil fields and advancing to the Caspian coast would have cut Iran and the Baku Oil off from the Soviets. Upon reaching the Caspian, all Soviet oil could only go south to Britain until captured by Germany which would have eventually lead to the capture of Iranian, Iraqi an Kuwaiti oil. This would have meant that both the Soviets and the British would be entirely reliant upon Texas, Egypt and Venezuela for oil, after the Japanese took the British and Dutch East Indies oilfields.
Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Iran were all very friendly to Germany (that is to say, popular street opinion and inside the army officer corps) and this was a huge lost opportunity for Germany; USSR had wanted to seize portions of Turkey as part of their secret negotiations with Germany and Germany could have used that to get Turkey on their side in 1941. There was a brief revolt in Iraq that Germany tried to assist but it wasn’t enough to dislodge the British.
Crap, I meant Ryan Faulk/Alternate Hypothesis not Dawson. Constantly getting my Ryan’s mixed up.
Excellent show guys. love the book review aspect. the blonde knight of Germany would also be a good topic – especilaly regarding soviet (kike) behavior.
Cover Japanese Imperialist war too please.
The French general that Hans was likely thinking of before DeGaulle was Marshal Petain.
I got super excited for a second when I thought Hans was actually Hans Lander from Myth20C.
The t34 was a steaming pile of shit. The QA was bad, had a two man turret, optics were nonexistance, visibility was bad, the turret was cramped, had no internal comms, most vehicles had no external comms. Mind you the t34-85 was easily a better tank, but the 76mm variants weren’t good tanks.
Another great podcast. Really enjoy history from ourguys pov.
The concept of the tank was WELL ACHSHUALLY invented by the Austrians. Checkmate, liberal
I have to say, Guderian isn’t the end all be all that he claimed to be. When it comes to Axis military leaders there are better examples of panzer leaders than him, like Joachim Peiper.
I don’t think this is a meaningful comparison. Peiper was a Waffen-SS Colonel who had barely turned 30 at the end of the war, although he also had some staff experience as Himmler’s adjutant. When I was in the Army we were taught that Col. Peiper had executed some vague Hitler order to murder captured PoWs, but this is not true. Although Peiper took responsibility during war crimes trials for the conduct of his youthful and jumpy troops who were undermanned when taking a large volume of American prisoners near Malmedy during the Battle of the Bulge, Peiper was miles… Read more »
This podcast is really hitting its stride. Great job gentlemen!
Hell yeah, something to listen to at work tomorrow.
Huge fan of Guderian and his book. Can’t wait to listen. Prussian Socialism at its best!
One of the best shows on TRS.
The Best.
Episodes 10 and older dont work on the player or as a download at the moment for an inexplicable reason. The download actually just downloads a 135kb “file”, player simply doesnt work.
Just a heads up. Otherwise, powered through 11-12 and enjoyed them all. And assume I will enjoy this one as well as I just started it up.
Worst case you can always find the podcast on odysee: https://odysee.com/@gregoryconte:2
Which also has the option to download in mp3 format.
I tend to fall into Hitlers thought, in a conversation with a movement ajecent content creator is that the generals should have obeyed him more often
Haven’t listened yet but this is my take too. German generals were hyper focused on tactics and were good at their job, but they had no thought for strategy and geopolitics, which was where Hitler was stronger.
I would agree that Hitler was generally right, such as the summer offensive of 1943. The Axis forces were battered and needed to rest and refit. The high command wanted and followed a cycle of attack, fail, and repeat.
By 1943 they should have been shifting to a fortress Europe mentality by limiting attacks to counter attacks only, building up the Fighter arm at the expense of the Bombers and putting maximum effort into getting the supper weapons like the Electroboat Submarines and mass jet engine production. Ultimately Germany would have to win back air supremacy over Europe to prevent the Nuclear attacks planed for Germany in 1945.
It’s hard for a former Corporal to explain to a General how they are mistaken and hard for a General to admit that the former Corporal might actually be correct.
Hitler was a systematic thinker, he could take in huge amounts of information and collate it into a coherent worldview. His generals were tacticians who knew things about operations at a granular level that Hitler couldn’t know; as such they wanted tasks that were obvious and right in front of them (take Moscow) rather than tasks that required thinking several steps ahead (cut off Caucasus oilfields to render Soviet armies incapable of maneuver warfare in 1942-43).
Thanks Greg, really appreciate these, listen multiple times usually